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Pension funding constraints and corporate expenditures 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of a company’s pension contributions on its dividend and 
investment policies. Using a sample of all FTSE350 UK listed firms with at least one defined 
benefit pension scheme from 2001 to 2004, we find a strong and negative relation between 
pension contributions and corporate dividend payments even after controlling for the correlation 
between funding status and unobserved investment opportunities. We find a weaker result using 
investment equations, where investment is negatively related to pension contributions but the 
relation is not statistically significant. Our results suggest a preference of financial rather than 
real channels for firms making balance sheet adjustments. We also examine whether the new 
funding requirements under the Pensions Act 2004 have had any effects on firms’ pension 
contributions and accordingly their corporate expenditure decisions. We include additional data 
from 2005-2006, and find that both dividend and investment sensitivity to pension contributions 
is more pronounced after the introduction of the new funding requirements. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent legislation in the UK (Pensions Act 1995, Pensions Act 2004) has required companies to 
ensure that their defined benefit pension liabilities are appropriately funded.  These regulations 
may impose financial pressures on companies, since in the presence of financial constraints, 
increased pension contributions will reduce the proportion of earnings available for investments 
and/or dividends payable to shareholders. The well-known Modigliani-Miller theory argues that 
corporate expenditure decisions are unaffected by financial considerations in perfect markets, 
but there is a large literature focusing on balance sheet adjustments in the presence of financial 
constraints in imperfect markets. Pension contributions need to be considered within a firm’s 
budget constraints, which depict the sources and uses of funds, and has a direct impact on the 
firm’s internally generated financial resources. If pension contributions are regarded as negative 
cash flows, an increase in the firm’s pension contributions will influence other uses of the firm’s 
capital such as dividends or investments either because of the budget constraints if there exists 
an optimal leverage level of the firm or because of costly external finance. An interesting 
question is whether this balance sheet adjustment is more likely to take place through financial 
(dividend) or real (investment) channels.  
 
This paper examines whether a company’s pension contributions has any effect on its dividend 
and investment policies, using the sample of all FTSE350 UK listed firms with at least one 
defined benefit pension scheme from 2001 to 2005. Bunn and Trivedi (2005) have previously 
looked at this question for UK listed non-financial companies over the period 1983-2002 and 
established that there is a significantly negative relation between pension contributions and 
dividends, but only weak evidence with respect to investment, leading them to conclude that 
balance-sheet adjustments in the presence of increasing pension contributions are more likely to 
be made through financial rather than real channels. However Rauh (2006) points out that the 
quantity of corporate investments undertaken is likely to be related to the availability of 
investment opportunities, which are not observable by a researcher. He argues that the funding 
status of the pension scheme will reflect the financial health of the company and the extent of 
such unobservable investment opportunities, and should be included as a conditioning variable 
in the dividend and investment equations. We extend this research on dividend/investment 
sensitivity to pension contributions, in two ways. First we investigate whether for UK firms the 
relationship persists after controlling for the potential correlations between the firm’s pension 
funding status and unobserved investment opportunities, as in Rauh (2006), making use of data 
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on pension funding status, that has only become available after the introduction of FRS17 
transitional arrangements in 2001. Second, we examine whether the establishment of the 
Pension Regulator under the Pensions Act 2004, with the powers to require companies to ensure 
their pension liabilities are fully funded, has affected dividends and/or investments. 
 
In the UK between 1995 and 2005, most private-sector defined benefit pension schemes were 
financed subject to the Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR) introduced in the Pensions Act 
1995. This established a baseline ratio of pension assets compared with scheme liabilities in 
order to cover the pensioner benefits in the event of the scheme being wound up. Schemes 
below a threshold funding status were required to make up the deficit within a number of years 
according to legally specified formulas imposed by the Pensions Act 1995 to achieve a 100% 
MFR funding level. In addition the MFR also enforced an upper bound on pension schemes to 
ensure that they were not overfunded. These regulations ensure that pension contributions are an 
exogenous variable which cannot be manipulated by the managers, and this is the key to the 
validity of the empirical specifications, as pension contributions can be regarded as an 
independent source of financial pressure different from those imposed by other cash flow 
requirements of the firm. However dissatisfaction with the operation of the MFR (Myners, 
2001), caused the MFR to be replaced by a new scheme-specific funding requirement from 2005 
as required by the Pensions Act 2004, and we will examine whether this new funding 
requirement has had an impact on the dividend and investment sensitivities. 
 
The funding status of a pension scheme is related to both dividends and investment through its 
correlation with pension contributions. However Rauh (2006) argues that funding status is also 
related to unobserved investment opportunities of the firm through the valuation of the scheme’s 
assets and liabilities and that this correlation does not have the same pattern as the function that 
links pension funding status with pension contributions
1
. Rauh (2006) observes that changes to 
the funding status of a DB pension scheme depend upon at least three factors, and each of these 
factors will vary cross-sectionally between firms. First, the assets of a pension scheme are 
usually invested in various financial securities like bonds or equity and according to FRS17 the 
assets ‘should be measured at their fair value at the balance sheet date’. So the funding status of 
the scheme will be determined by the performance of these investments and a more solvent 
                                                            
1
 The relationship between pension funding status and investment opportunities is likely to be smooth, whereas the 
correlation between mandatory contributions and funding status is given by the legal framework, with a ‘kink’ at 
100% funding ratio. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 3 
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funding status will indicate better investment opportunities. Second, according to FRS17 
pension scheme liabilities are measured using a projected unit method and discounted at an AA 
corporate bond rate, which is implicitly influenced by the overall investment performance of the 
market. Third, the firm’s funding status is also affected by voluntary contributions it makes to 
the pension scheme according to the firm’s own financial strength and investment performance, 
and so the funding status is linked to the profitability of the firm’s investments. In the United 
Kingdom, with the increased transparency induced by retirement benefit accounting standards 
such as FRS17, one would be able to see this relation more clearly. Funding status constitutes a 
missing variable that should be included in the empirical specifications of Bunn and Trivedi 
(2005), so that the sensitivity of dividends and investments to pension contributions, need to be 
conditioned on the pension funding status. 
 
Using a sample of FTSE350 UK listed firms with at least one defined benefit pension scheme 
from 2001 to 2004, we find a strong and negative relation between pension contributions and 
corporate dividend payments even after controlling for the correlation between funding status 
and unobserved investment opportunities. Moreover when replacing the total contribution 
variable with simulated mandatory pension contributions to capture the interaction between 
contributions and pension funding status, the contribution variable loses its explanatory power 
in contrast to the results for the US in Rauh (2006). This may be due to the different contributing 
rules in UK and US as well as the failure of FRS 17 valuation to capture the MFR funding status. 
We find a weaker set of results when applied to the investment equations, where although 
investment is negatively related to pension contributions, the relation is not statistically 
significant. Our results suggest that even after controlling for the endogeneity of pension 
funding status, companies appear to make balance sheet adjustments using financial rather than 
real channels,  
 
In order to assess whether the funding requirements under the Pensions Act 2004 have had any 
effect on firms’ pension contributions and accordingly on their corporate expenditure decisions, 
we included additional data after the introduction of the new funding requirement. We find 
significant differences in the slope coefficients of the pension contribution variables before and 
after 2005 suggesting that the corporate expenditure sensitivities to pension contributions are 
significantly stronger after the introduction of the Pensions Act 2004. These results indicate that 
dividends and investments are more sensitive to the contributions made under the Pensions Act 
2004 rather than the smoothed contributions under the MFR.  
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses in more details the theories behind 
corporate budget constraints and balance sheet adjustment in an imperfect market. Section 3 
compares the funding requirement in US and UK and introduces the empirical specifications for 
dividends and investment. Section 4 presents the sample selection and descriptive statistics. 
Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 presents the evidence from adding the more 
recent data after the introduction of the new funding requirement into the regressions and 
section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Pension Contributions and Balance Sheet Adjustment 
According to the Modigliani-Miller theory, financing considerations are irrelevant in perfect 
capital markets. In the absence of taxes, asymmetric information and agency problems, the 
market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure. All corporate financial decisions, 
linking the source and use of funds, at time t can be expressed as: 
( ) ( ) tttrtttt IDrτdDEτ +−+=++− 1∆Π1 Π                                  (1) 
where τΠ is the corporate tax rate, Π is the nominal profit, E is the value of new issues or new 
equity, ∆Dt can be regarded as new bond issues or new debt raised at time t so the sources of 
corporate expenditure (after-tax profit plus new equity issues and new bond issues) must equal 
the uses of those funds, expressed as the sum of dividends (d), interest payable (r is the interest 
rate and the interest rate being reduced by τr reflects that the debt is tax-deductible) and 
investment (I). However the stock market environment is far from perfect: the non-tax 
assumption is obviously violated in equation (1); it is often believed that the managers of the 
firms have better information than outside investors; and agency problems arise if managers act 
in their own interests..  
 
If a firm’s DB pension scheme is in deficit, which could either result from an unexpected 
increase in pension liabilities or a decrease in the value of the pension assets, the company will 
need to make contributions into the pension scheme from its profits. Pension contributions 
should be seen as a component of corporate expenditures, and need to be included into the 
firm’s budget constraint in equation (1). Expressing the net profit after pension contributions 
(ΠPension) as the gross earnings  minus pension contribution (PC): 
 tt
Pension
t PC−= ΠΠ                                                 (2) 
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equation (1) can be rearranged as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ttttrtttt PCτIDrτdDEτ −++−+=++− 11∆Π1 Π                (3) 
Equations (1) and (3) illustrate that when a firm faces financial pressures, balance sheet 
adjustments needs to be undertaken to restore the sources and uses equality. The balance sheet 
adjustment can take place through dividend distributions and new equity issuance, or real 
investments.  
 
Assuming that gross earnings are exogenous, and also holding the company’s equity and debt 
volumes constant, an increase in pension contribution must reduce either dividends or 
investment, or both. This can be easily understood by rearranging equation (3) as:  
( )( ) ( ) ttttttt PCDEDId τ∆Πτ −−++−−=+ 11                       (4) 
and equation (4) will serve as the fundamental specification for empirical tests in the following 
sections.  
 
Myers (2001) summarises why capital structure might matters in investment decisions. His 
paper focuses on two alternative theories: the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. The 
trade-off theory relaxes the non-tax assumption in Modigliani and Miller (1958) and predicts 
that since debt interest payments are usually tax-deductible, managers tend to take advantage of 
this tax shield until the benefit is fully offset by the possible cost of financial distress or credit 
down-grading caused by higher leverage. Although MacKie-Mason (1990) and Graham (1996) 
find some support for the trade-off theory, other work is contradictory since the theory is 
confronted by the finding that more profitable companies with higher credit ratings often borrow 
less (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Wald, 1999; Graham, 2000).  According to the trade-off theory, 
an increase in pension contribution should have no effect on a firm’s total borrowings, as firms 
are already at their optimal leverage that fully exploits the corporate tax shields. Holding 
everything else constant, an increase in corporate expenses through higher pension contributions 
has to be offset by lower dividends or investment or both. 
 
The pecking order theory is based on information asymmetries between managers and the stock 
market, and asserts that the financing of investments by a firm is undertaken by first using 
internal resources, then debt and, as a final resort, equity (Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984)). A new equity issue by managers, which would dilute current shareholders’ ownership 
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of the firm, therefore could be taken by potential investors as a signal that the existing stock is 
overvalued. Empirical studies have found support for the pecking order theory (Asquith and 
Mullins, 1986; Dierkens, 1991; Eckbo, 1986; and Shyam-Sunder, 1991) and some suggest it 
better explains the financial behaviour of the sample firms (Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)). 
As pension contributions are subtracted from profit, an increase in pension contributions will 
reduce the internally available funds to finance corporate expenditures. As firms prefer internal 
to external finance according to the pecking order theory, firms with increased pension 
contributions will have to reduce the dividend payment to keep the same level of internal funds 
for capital investment or alternatively cut their expenditures on investment as a result of lower 
internal funds. Even if firm turns to external finance, they will do so by borrowing and 
investment will be lower than otherwise to reflect the increase in the cost of capital. Tests of the 
pecking-order versus trade-off theories have concluded that the pecking order theory applies to 
large mature firms, and the trade-off-theory to small, young growth firms (Fama and French, 
2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
 
As well as the corporate finance view, there are also several studies on capital structure from the 
tax literature. The ‘new view’ of dividend taxation first proposed by King (1977) and Auerbach 
(1979) suggests that the real investment decisions of a firm are predetermined because of 
differential taxation of corporate and personal income; and therefore any balance sheet 
adjustments are more likely to take place through financial channels such as dividends. Similar 
to the pecking order theory, the `new view’ predicts that firms prefer to use internally generated 
funds by earnings retention to fund investment rather than using externally raised equity and 
distribute residual funds as dividends. Auerbach and Hassett (2002) find empirical support for 
this theory using US data. According to the new view, an increase in pension contributions will 
reduce the amount of internally available funds for investment. Therefore to keep investments at 
their profit maximizing level, dividends will be adjusted downwards  
 
Following Benito and Young (2007), Bunn and Trivedi (2005) apply the dynamic panel data 
model developed by Blundell, Bond, Devereux and Schiantarelli (1992), and Bond, Chennells 
and Devereux (1996), to the dividend and investment equations and estimate the effect of 
pension contributions on corporate expenditures. Consistent with both trade-off and pecking 
order theories, they find pension contributions are negatively and significantly related to both 
dividends and investment, although the evidence is weaker on investment, suggesting balance 
sheet adjustment take place through financial (dividends) rather than real (investment) channels.  
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We have argued that the current funding status of a pension scheme can affect investments.  
Rauh (2006) considers the endogeneity between funding status and investment in a US context 
and by dividing firm cash flows into pension- and non-pension-related components, he finds that 
the negative relation between capital expenditure and pension contributions still holds even 
when controlling for the correlations between the pension funding status and the firm’s 
unobserved investment opportunities. However it may be argued that these effects may not be 
symmetric for overfunded (the fair value of scheme assets is greater than the fair value of 
liabilities) and underfunded (the fair value of scheme assets is less than the fair value of 
liabilities) schemes, both because of the limits imposed on scheme overfunding (discussed in the 
next section) and because managers could anticipate the gains from a surplus in the pension plan 
due to short termism and adjust corporate expenditures accordingly (Gross, 1995; Franzoni and 
Marin, 2006). 
 
3. Regulatory Funding Requirements and Empirical Specifications 
In this section we first present the relevant regulations for pension contributions by comparing 
the funding requirement in US and UK, and we then examine the implications of these 
regulations for the empirical specifications for dividends and investment models and the choice 
of econometric techniques that best fit the data and the model. 
 
i.  Pension Funding Requirements in US and UK 
In US the calculation of pension contribution are based on both SEC (Securities and Exchange 
Commission) and IRS (Internal Revenue Service) form 5500 filings. Langbein and Wolk (2000) 
provide a detailed guideline on pension and employee benefits in the US. Generally speaking, 
firms with underfunded pension schemes are required to make contributions equal to the new 
benefits accrued during the previous year plus a fraction of the funding shortfall whilst firms 
with overfunded plans do not have to make contributions but the extent to which a scheme can 
be overfunded is limited by maximum deductibility laws to prevent firms from deliberately 
increasing pension plan surplus by reducing employee benefits. 
 
Under the US pension law, firms with defined benefit pension plans are required to make 
contributions according to either minimum funding contribution (MFC) or the deficit reduction 
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contribution (DRC) rule, whichever is larger. The former was first introduced in 1974 by the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) which established the minimum funding 
standards for most voluntary pension and health plans in the private industry. According to 
MFC, firms must make annual contributions equal to the cost of benefits earned during the year 
(‘normal cost’) and any unfunded shortfalls in the plan (which may be amortised) in order to 
maintain a "funding standard account". The DRC is the contribution established to reduce the 
shortfall of the plan until the funding status reaches some threshold level, in which the plan 
assets are between 80% and 90% of the current liabilities of the plan (i.e. 80% to 90% funded).  
 
Funding requirement in US were changed though the Pension Protection Act (PPA) which came 
into effect in 2008. The new PPA rules apply differently to single- and multi-employer plans. 
The funding requirement for single-employer plan is simply that a plan must stay fully funded 
(i.e. plan assets equal or exceed its liabilities). If a plan is fully funded, the minimum required 
contribution is the cost of benefits earned during the year. The contribution will also include the 
amount necessary to amortize the deficit over seven years if a plan is not fully funded and 
stricter rules will apply to severely underfunded plans or plans in ‘at-risk status’. For multi-
employer pension plans, most of the pre-PPA funding rules will apply but the amortization 
period for benefit improvements will be shortened. 
 
The British system of funding for DB pension plans is similar but was established later than its 
US counterpart, and only after the debacle of the Maxwell scandal of 1991. As a part of the 
Pensions Act 1995, the Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR) was introduced from April 1997 
and applies to most private-sector defined benefit pension schemes. MFR sets its own methods 
for calculating the funding status of defined benefit schemes and is operated in a similar way to 
the DRC mentioned above. For a scheme which has a funding level less than 90% the sponsor 
has to make up the shortfall below 90% within three years whereas for schemes between 90% 
and 100% funded the shortfall has to be paid off over a period not to exceed ten years. The 
detailed methods and assumptions for minimum funding valuation were specified in Guidance 
Note 27 issued by the Institute of Actuaries and the Faculty of Actuaries and a summary can be 
found in Davis (2000). The Pensions Act 1995 also enforces a limit for scheme overfunding, 
where schemes more than 105% funded have to reduce the surplus by benefit improvement or 
contribution decrease.  
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However the MFR was heavily criticised by Myners (2001). First in a number of cases, the level 
of assets required by the MFR proved insufficient to provide the benefits promised by the 
scheme. Second, it increased the regulatory costs for sponsoring firms without delivering the 
level of security as expected. Third, it made firms focus on meeting the requirements of the 
MFR, rather than on developing an appropriate funding strategy for meeting their specific 
pension commitments, which hampers firms from making appropriate investment decision. The 
Pensions Act 2004 replaced the MFR with a new scheme funding objective allowing more 
flexibly to individual schemes' circumstances whilst at the same time protecting members' 
benefits. Pension scheme trustees have the discretion to decide on an appropriate strategy for 
funding their pension commitments and making up any funding deficits, given advice from the 
actuary. The new funding requirement does not violate the Pension Protection Fund valuation 
methods, as the latter is carried out separately for all participating schemes with a consistent 
measure in order to achieve fairness across schemes  
 
According to Bunn and Trivedi (2005), the MFR ensured that ‘an employer’s contribution to 
pension scheme is a bounded variable which cannot be adjusted in response to the company’s 
financial conditions… (and) … adjusting contributions … is clearly restricted’. They regard this 
fact as the key to the validity of their empirical specifications, as they argue pension 
contributions can be regarded as a relatively exogenous variable under the MFR. 
 
ii.  Empirical Specifications 
The empirical specifications for dividend and investment follow those by Benito and Young 
(2007), although we choose to scale the variables by the total assets of the firm rather than sales 
or capital stock.
2
. The modified specification for dividends is 
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where all the variables are scaled by A—year-end book value of total assets—where applicable, 
D is the firm’s dividend net of tax, I  is investment, CF is cash flow, cgr is the capital gearing 
ratio and br is the borrowing ratio. Q is the Tobin’s Q, PC is pension contributions disclosed in 
                                                            
2
 Most of the investment literature chooses the scaling variables arbitrarily between assets and capital See for 
example , Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000), Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003), and Rauh (2006).  
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the profit and loss account
3
, X is the controlling variables that account for the funding status of 
the pension scheme defined as the net deficit of the pension scheme (scaled by assets)
4
. The 
variable τt is a dummy variable that equals to 1 for year t and 0 otherwise so by construction the 
term 
2004
2002
D
t t
t
γ τ
=
∑ standards for the common year effects in the panel regression and ζt is the 
company specific effect whilst ε is the error term, where the subscript D denotes coefficients in 
dividend specification. These year and company fixed effects allow for both changes in 
economic conditions on dividend payments, and the characteristics of some companies to be 
either high or low pay-out types. Note all specifications (including the dividend and investment 
equation) have a constant term but we choose not to report these in the empirical results. 
 
α8 and µ are the coefficients of interest. Generally speaking, according to both trade-off and 
pecking order theories α8 is expected to be negative if pension contributions are treated as a 
‘negative’ cashflow. If pension deficits have a clear anticipated contribution effect or liquidity 
effect on corporate expenditure and is correlated with the unobserved investment opportunities, 
it should be negatively related to investment or in other words, positively related to dividends, 
as lower investment expenditures will increase the available funds for dividend payment so µ is 
expected to be positive.  
 
As previously discussed, firms prefer to finance investment through retained earnings because of 
asymmetric information (pecking order theory) or differential taxation (‘new view’ of dividend 
taxation) therefore firms with better investment opportunities or large investment volumes are 
less willing to pay dividends, which also needs to be subtracted from retained earnings. So a 
testable hypothesis is that α3 is negative. Since cash flow is also highly correlated with retained 
earnings, dividends should react positively to it, i.e. α4 > 0 (Auerbach and Hassett (2000)).  
 
The capital gearing ratio (cgr) and borrowing ratio (br) proxy for the leverage level of the firm 
and subsequently its financial pressure. We define br to be the Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) 
borrowing ratio, a proxy of general financial pressure other than pension contributions, which is 
calculated as net interest payment divided by pre-tax profits. The effect of debt on dividends 
                                                            
3 Datastream item X114. Bunn and Trivedi (2005) provide the detailed rationale why this is a sensible measure of 
firms’ pension contributions. 
4
 So fundingstatus is negative for overfunded firms and positive for underfunded firms. 
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(and investment) is ambiguous, as according to the trade-off theory by adjusting debt to its 
optimal level, investment or dividends do not need to change as the adjustment can be 
undertaken through the raise of new equity. However according to the pecking order theory, 
leverage represents the firm’s need for external finance and a higher debt level could imply that 
the firm has less internal fund for dividend payment or investment to reflect a higher cost of 
capital so leverage ratio should be negatively related to corporate expenditure. 
 
Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm's assets (as measured by the 
market value of its outstanding stock and debt) to the replacement cost of the firm's assets. It 
measures the relevant performance of the firm by looking at how market values the assets and is 
also related to the unobserved investment opportunities of the firm. If investment is indeed 
negatively related to dividend payment, this would imply a negative relation between Q and 
dividend as a higher Q stands for a higher demand for investment fund (i.e. α7 < 0). However  Q 
is difficult to measure since the replacement costs of a firm’s assets are often unknown, so it is 
common to calculate Q by approximation (Chung and Pruitt, 1994). This paper follows the 
construction by Rauh (2006) to set Q simply as the market-to-book ratio of firm assets, which is 
calculated as 
it
itititit
it
A
xDeferredTatyCommonEquiAMC
Q
−−+
=                    (7) 
where MC  is the market capitalisation of the firm. 
 
The modified specification for investment is 
2
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                     (8) 
where S is the total sales of the firm, the other variables are as previously defined in the dividend 
equation and the superscript I represents coefficients in the investment equation. The coefficient 
for pension contribution (β8) should be zero according to the afore-mentioned capital structure 
theories but υ is expected to be negative due to the positive correlation between pension assets 
and investment. The estimates for debt level (β5 and β6) should also have the same effect on 
investment as with the dividend equation. As the new explanatory variable, total sales (S) is 
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correlated with the current cash flow (CF) thus one would expect similar patterns for the 
estimates of these two variables. And if Q proxies unobserved investment opportunities, it 
should be positively related to the investment volume (i.e. β7 > 0) 
 
The investment-cash flow sensitivities (β4) in the investment model should be interpreted with 
caution. Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) link this sensitivity with financial constraints of 
the company. By making similar assumptions to the pecking order theory that external finance is 
more costly than internal finance due to asymmetric information, they show that greater 
investment-cash flow sensitivities imply firms rely more on internal funds and a larger 
‘information premium’ on external funds, which they regard as a sign of financial constraints. 
However several studies have raised doubts as to the presence of financial constraints within 
firms having high investment-cash flow sensitivities. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) find empirical 
evidence against Fazzari, et al (1988) by showing that using the same sample but a different 
empirical methodology, less financially constrained firms exhibit significantly greater 
sensitivities than firms that appear more financially constrained. Some studies (e.g. Gomes 
(2001)) have also argued that the results by Fazzari et al (1988) lie on the strong assumption that 
the Tobin’s Q in their investment specification is a proxy for investment opportunities, which 
may be unrealistic in imperfect capital markets. 
 
For both investment and dividend equations, the first and second lags of the dependent variable 
are included as explanatory variables. This approach allows for the persistence of the dependent 
variables especially for dividends, as Lintner (1956) argues that companies are reluctant to 
reduce dividends as firms are uncertain about the signal provided to the market by departing 
from the previous dividend level. This would imply a positive estimate for lagged dividends (α1 
and α2) and the higher the value, the higher the degree of persistence in dividend payments.  
 
Both equations 6 and 8 are fixed effects dynamic panel data (DPD) models by construction. By 
including lagged dependent variables in the right-hand side, the regression errors are no longer 
uncorrelated with the independent variables.  A general solution is to use instrumental variables 
and we use the generalised methods of moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and 
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Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995).
5
. We employ the two-step robust GMM-system 
estimator introduced by Blundell and Bond (1998).  
 
4.  Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
The sample consists of all firms from the FTSE350 constituent list that have at least one defined 
benefit pension scheme. All the company accounts data except for the pension funding status 
figures are taken from Thomson Financial Datastream Historical Company Accounts data 
(1965-2005) purchased by ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council) and the ESDS 
(Economic and Social Data Service) in conjunction with Datastream current datasets where 
applicable
6
. Post-2005 most financial data such as dividends and investments are replaced by 
data from Thomson ONE  Banker. The pension funding status data are hand-collected from 
individual company’s annual reports and accounts based on FRS17/IAS19 disclosures from 
2001, the first year such disclosures are available according to FRS17, to 2004, the last year 
when matching data on dividends and investment are available from Datastream historical data. 
The full data ranges from financial year 2000 to 2007
7
 however as both the dividend and 
investment specifications have lagged dependent variables up to the second order, only these 
two dependent variables (D/At and I/At) cover the whole duration of the sample years and the 
rest of the variables are between 2001 to 2006. The size of the full sample is 935 year-end 
observations, on 196 individual firms.  
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and the distribution of the variables. All variables are 
winsorized at 99% level to prevent any outlier effects. Panel A reports summary statistics for the 
data over the period 2000-2005. The mean dividend-to-asset ratio is 5.6% and the median is 
4.0%. Corporate expenditures on investment have an average of 6.4% over assets with median 
value being 5.8%. The cash flow variable (CF) is calculated as after-tax income plus 
depreciation. Normally this is the cash flow reported on income statements and it does not 
contain pension contribution data therefore the specification for cash flow is consistent with 
decomposition of corporate expenditures in equation 1. The mean ratio of cash flow to assets is 
                                                            
5
 In this paper where both first- and second-order lagged dependent variables are included, the validity of the GMM 
estimators lies on the assumption that there is only first-order serial correlation within dependent variable but no 
second-order serial correlations in the differential equations. These assumptions are testable and results are reported 
in the empirical results section below. 
6
 This is because since 2005 Datastream eliminates data that ceases to be publish in company accounts from its 
dataset  and they are no longer to be found in the standard Datastream package.. 
7 A financial year is defined as from 1st July in the previous year to 30th June in the following year; and therefore 
the data is collected up till 30/06/2008. 
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14.4% and the median is 14.2%. The capital gearing ratio (cgr) is taken from Datastream (item 
x731) and the borrowing ratio (br) uses the Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) definition, calculated 
as net interest payment divided by pre-tax profits. It can be seen that the borrowing ratio has an 
average value of 14.8% which is only half the value of the mean borrowing ratio (31.8%) in 
Bunn and Trivedi (2005), who use data from all UK quoted firms. This can be explained as the 
firms in our sample are FTSE350 firms and are relatively larger UK companies with less 
financial pressures, proxied by the Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) borrowing ratio. Tobin’s Q is 
constructed as the market-to-book ratio of assets following Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) and 
Rauh (2006). The mean and the median Q is 2.13 and 1.62 respectively, which is comparable 
with the US values in Rauh (2006). 
 
The pension contribution data uses the company accounts reported in Datastream (item x114: 
pension contributions). Note that according to the MFR, pension contributions are smoothed 
over the years; so this measure may not represent the exact cash contributions of the firm. Bunn 
and Trivedi (2005) discussed this issue in detail and by comparing the smoothed figure with the 
non-smoothed hand-collected data on pension contributions from company accounts, they found 
that ,the Datastream measure of pension contributions successfully captures the time-series and 
cross-sectional variations within the ‘true values’. They conclude that x114 is an eligible 
candidate for the company’s pension contributions. The mean pension contribution is 1.7% of 
total assets and the median value is 1.3%.  
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of pension contributions relative to assets for the sample years. 
The mean values are greater than the median values in all 4 years, indicating that the distribution 
of pension contributions is positively skewed. Moreover, it can be seen that the contribution 
level remains relatively stable during the course of the years, which is consistent with pension 
contributions being smoothed over time. The findings are confirmed by Figure 2, which plots 
the distribution of PC/A over time. When pension contributions are divided according to 
percentiles, they also tent to follow a relatively stable and smoothed path, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Funding Status measures the difference between the market value of pension assets and the 
present value of pension liabilities, in which a positive value means the scheme is in deficit, i.e. 
underfunded (overfunded if the scheme has surplus). This measure is equivalent to the 
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retirement benefit liabilities disclosed in the balance sheet according to the requirement by 
FRS17/IAS19 and this represents the true liabilities of the firm. Overfunding (Underfunding) is 
the absolute value of Funding Status for overfunded (underfunded) firms. The mean percentage 
of pension deficit to asset (Funding Status/A) is 9.5% and of the total number of 675 
observations, 601 are underfunded. The figures depicts the severe shortfall within UK pension 
schemes in recent years recognised after the introduction of FRS17, where all pension deficits 
have to be reported on the corporate balance sheet. The average overfunding and underfunding 
over assets is 12.3% and 12.5% with median value of 2.5% and 7.2%, respectively. This is more 
clearly observed if one recodes the funding status into dummies (1 means underfunding and vice 
versa). The average value is 0.89 and the majority of the sample schemes are in deficit. 
 
In order to check the relationship between pension funding status and pension contributions, a 
kernel regression is run on pooled contribution and funding status data, which enables one to 
investigate the nonparametric relation between the two variables. Figure 3 reports the result of 
kernel smoothing of pension contributions (PC/A) on pension funding status (funding status/A) 
without imposing any functional formal using the Epanechnikov kernel. It can be seen that 
pension contributions increase as the funding status deteriorates. Moreover, there is a clear 
pattern that for schemes with less severe funding status, the change of pension contributions 
with respect to funding status is relatively small and stable, whilst for schemes with larger 
deficit, pension contributions increase dramatically as the funding status gets worse. This 
finding is consistent with the different smoothing times for schemes with different funding 
status, as imposed by the MFR, that the period over which a scheme can contribute to pay off 
pension deficit is much longer (10 years) for better funded schemes than for severely 
underfunded schemes (3 years). 
 
5. Empirical Results 
This section reports the regression results for the empirical models ver the period 2000-2005 
using the two-step GMM-system estimator; first considering the effect of pension contributions 
on dividends and then on investment. 
i.  Dividend Equations 
Table 2 shows the empirical results from estimating equation 6 for the dataset 2000-2005. For 
all estimates in Table 2, the GMM differenced equation uses all available instruments from t = 2 
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to t = 6.  There are four firms that never pay any dividend throughout the duration of the sample 
and these are excluded from the analysis to ensure that these outliers do not drive the results; 
any clustering effect within the omitted firms are controlled by firm-specific fixed effects in the 
regressions.
8
 
 
Specification (1) is the basic dividend specification without pension funding status included. 
The main findings are consistent with the empirical predictions of the theoretical models 
discussed previously. The coefficient on cash flow (CF/A) has a point estimate of 2.547. 
Although not within conventional level, it implies that higher cash flow will increase a firms 
dividend payments as predicted by the firm budget constrain equation 1. As a proxy for 
unobserved investment opportunities, Tobin’s Q has a point estimate of –0.042 and is significant 
at the usual levels. The result is consistent with both the pecking-order and the new view of tax 
theories, which states that firms prefer to use internally available funds to finance investment, 
and therefore a higher level of investment, as proxied by higher Q level, would reduce dividend 
payments, which are also financed through internal funds such as retained earnings. Although 
not statistically significant, investment (I/A) is negatively related to dividends, as predicted by 
firms’ preference over internal funds. The coefficient estimates on leverage ratios (cgr and br) 
are both statistically insignificant, which is consistent with the trade-off theory as firms with 
optimal debt levels do not necessarily have to undertake balance sheet adjustments through 
either dividends or investments.  
 
The coefficient estimate of pension contributions in Specification (1) is –9.59 and is significant 
at 95% confidence level. The finding is consistent with the previously discussed theoretical 
models that pension contributions are regarded as negative cash flows and will either affect the 
firm’s budget constraints in equation 1 according to the trade-off theory, or reduce the internal 
available funds to finance dividend payment according to the pecking order theory, both 
predicting that higher pension contributions will result in lower dividend payments. However 
the absolute magnitude of the coefficient estimate is large relative to the values in Rauh (2006)
9
.  
 
Specifications (2) and (3) add the pension funding status as a control to capture the correlation 
between funding status and unobserved investment opportunities. Specification (2) uses the 
                                                            
8
 Bunn and Trivedi (2005) report that firms that never pay dividend are mainly new and high-tech companies 
9
 See Rauh (2006)) reports an estimate between -0.60 to -0.83 for pension contributions in his investment equation. 
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overall funding status as the control and the point estimate of pension contribution reduces its 
magnitude to –3.82 but is not statistically significant. However when dividing funding status 
into overfunding and underfunding in Specification (3), pension contributions become 
significantly negatively related to dividends with a coefficient estimate of –11.85. The funding 
status itself is positively related to dividend payments but the effect is not significant. Moreover, 
the coefficient estimate on overfunding is –2.14 and significant at 95% level. The negative 
relation is similar to the effect of Tobin’s Q on dividends, where a pension surplus implies better 
investment opportunities and higher investment demands, which will consequently reduce the 
funds for dividends.  
 
One way to capture the interaction between pension contributions and the pension funding status 
is to isolate the proportion of the contribution that is made voluntarily by the sponsoring firm 
from the total contributions and only consider the mandatory contributions legally required by 
pension funding regulations (Rauh (2006)). We construct such a variable to approximate the 
mandatory contributions by defining a new pension contribution variable that equals a funding 
status dummy (fundingdummy in Table 2), which is 1 for underfunded schemes with 90% 
funding ratio under the FRS 17 valuation and 0 otherwise multiplied by the pension contribution 
(PC/A).
 10
 Specification (4) reports the dividend sensitivity of this simulated variable using 
underfunding and overfunding as control variables. Although the absolute magnitude of the 
coefficient estimate of pension contributions has increased to –15.49, it has lost its explanatory 
power. This again confirms the relative imprecision of the ‘simulated’ mandatory contribution 
especially under the smoothed funding requirement by the MFR.  
 
Specifications (5) and (6) remove the Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) borrowing ratio from 
specifications (3) and (4) as it is highly correlated to the cash flow term (CF/A) by construction. 
Removing this term does not alter the results significantly though pension contributions turn out 
to be negatively significant with a point estimate of –5.03 in Specification (5) using pension 
funding status as the control variable. Dropping the borrowing ratio also increases the statistical 
significance of investment, which becomes significant at 90% confidence level in Specification 
(5) and (6) with point estimates of –0.46 and –0.75 respectively. 
 
                                                            
10
 We have chosen 90% as the threshold funding ratio because this is the level under MFR which will trigger 
mandatory contributions. Furthermore, because of the MFR smoothing funding rules discussed in the previous 
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The samples firms used in this study are all constituents of the FTSE350 index, and are 
relatively large in company size therefore in general we do not allow for any size effect in 
specifications (1) to (6). However we did try to divide the firms according to their size to pick 
up any group fixed effects in the regression, in specifications (7) and (8), where we include 
group dummies by dividing firms into quartiles according to their total assets. We found that 
group dummies are not significant, confirming our conjecture that group effects are not the 
driver of the results. 
 
The autocorrelation test (row AR(1) and AR(2) in Table 2) enables one to check the dynamics 
of the dependent variable, and there is limited evidence of dividend persistence judged by the 
lagged dividend payments at first and second order.  First-order serial correlation is only weakly 
significant in Specification (5), and the absence of second-order serial correlation ensures the 
validity of the GMM-system estimator. Furthermore, the Sargan test of overidentifying 
restriction cannot be rejected in all specifications. 
 
ii.  Investment Equations 
Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates of the panel regression of investment on pension 
contributions in equation 8 using the two-step GMM-system estimator. The inclusion of lagged 
dependent variables ensures the two-step estimation method to be valid as there is no evidence 
of second-order serial correlation for all specifications. However contrary to the findings by 
Benito and Young (2007), there is no clear evidence of persistence in investment and moreover, 
the first lag of dependent variable is negatively significant in Specifications (1) to (3) and 
Specification (8) with point estimate between  –0.46 and –0.40. This might be caused by the 
positive correlation between investment and book assets as we have defined investments as total 
payments on fixed assets and if this is the case, a higher value of investment in the previous year 
will increase total assets, which consequently reduces the value of the dependent variable. For 
all specifications the Sargan test is not rejected, suggesting that the overidentifying restrictions 
are valid in our model. 
 
Specification (1) is the principal equation to be tested. In the absence of pension funding status, 
the pension contributions are negatively related to investment with a point estimate of -7.79 but 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
sections, we regard it as inappropriate to construct the mandatory contribution variable in the context of the UK 
similar to the one used in Rauh (2006) as MC = min (TC, pension deficit). 
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are not significant at the 10% level. The estimate is close to that in dividend equation, providing 
support for the trade-off theory that balance sheet adjustments can take place through either 
channel. Specifications (2) and (3) add pension funding status into the basic specification and it 
is found to be negatively related to investment, consistent with our prediction that funding status 
is positively correlated to unobserved investment opportunities, though the coefficient estimates 
are again insignificant. Specification (4) uses the approximated mandatory pension contribution 
but the investment sensitivity remains insignificant. Our findings are weaker than those in Rauh 
(2006), who finds a strong negative relation between mandatory pension contribution and 
investment, but our results are similar to those in Bunn and Trivedi (2005), who also only find a 
weak negative relationship between pension contributions and investments. One possible 
explanation for these different investment sensitivities to pension contributions between the US 
and UK samples is that the definitions of mandatory contributions in the US may be a more 
precise measure of financial pressures imposed on corporate expenditures, and it seems harder 
to construct such a definitive measure in a UK context under the MFR regime. 
 
Other than pension related variables, only total sales is weakly related to total investment in 
Specification (2), with a point estimate of 0.118. As a robustness check, we removed the 
borrowing ratio in Specification (5) and (6) and this reduces the standard errors in the cash flow 
terms, indicating that the borrowing ratio is indeed related to cash flow and picks up some of the 
effect of cash flow on corporate expenditure. Specifications (7) and (8) check whether there 
exists any size effects within our model by adding company specific fixed effects in the panel 
regression but the results are not significantly changed, implying that size effects are not the 
driver for our empirical findings. Another robustness test we undertook was to use the capital 
stock as the denominator in the investment equations as in Bunn and Trivedi (2005). These 
results are not reported but although we managed to find more significant estimates on other 
accounting variables, there is still no robust relation between pension contributions and 
investment. Moreover, this regression dramatically increases the magnitude and the standard 
errors of pension contribution variable to some abnormal level. 
 
6. Impact of post-2005 Funding Requirements on Corporate Expenditure Decisions 
In Section 3 we explained that post-2005, UK firms with DB pension schemes have had to make 
contributions under the new funding requirement set out in the Pensions Act 2004. Unlike the 
universal funding requirements for all firms under the MFR, the funding requirements that 
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succeeded the MFR regulations, are more firm-specific and the contributions made by firms 
under such requirements represent a more precise measure of mandatory payments into the 
pension scheme, since under MFR any mandatory contributions could be spread over a number 
of years. In order to assess the impact of the new funding requirement on corporate expenditure 
decisions after the introduction of the Pensions Act 2004, additional tests were run by including 
group dummies using the most recent data until 2007. 
 
The reason why this analysis is separated from the earlier empirical section of the paper is 
because the Datastream entry for pension contributions (x114) used in the previous section as 
well as some other variables (such as investment variables x1026 and x479) are no longer 
available after 2004. Post-2005 most financial data such as dividends and investments are 
replaced by data from Thomson ONE  Banker and every effort has been made the ensure the 
consistency of the post-2004 data with the pre-2004 data. However pension contribution data is 
not available in Thomson ONE Banker, and in order to undertake the analysis, the first task is to 
approximate the pension contributions made by individual firms using the data that is available. 
 
A DB pension scheme has two primary elements: scheme assets and scheme liabilities. Figure 4 
shows the main components of the assets and liabilities of a typical DB scheme as disclosed in 
the footnote of the firm’s financial statement according to FRS 17. The left-hand side of Figure 
4 shows the composition of pension assets. In the UK, both the sponsoring firms and member 
employees have to make contributions to the DB scheme trust, which is usually invested into 
bonds, equities and other asset classes in order to meet its long-term obligations. Therefore the 
fair value of the pension assets at the end of the year equals the sum of assets value at the 
beginning of the year plus the investment returns on the assets and any new contributions made 
to the scheme minus pension benefits paid during the year. The right-hand side of Figure 4 
shows the calculation of pension obligations. There are two main kinds of costs accrued during 
the accounting period: service cost and interest cost. Service cost is the additional liability 
created because another year has elapsed, for which all current employees get another year's 
pension benefit for their service. Pension interest cost is the annual accrued interest on 
previously incurred pension benefit obligations reflecting the increase of the present value of the 
projected pension obligation as employees are getting one year closer to receiving their pension 
benefits. The year-end pension liabilities are equal to the sum of opening liabilities and pension 
costs accrued during the year minus the obligations that are paid off (benefits paid) during the 
year. From Figure 4, the fair value of a DB scheme in year t can be written as: 
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ttttt PBPCROAPAPA −++= −1                                  (9) 
Rearranging equation 9 we have: 
ttttt PBROAPAPAPC +−−= −1                              (10) 
which shows how pension contributions are approximated when such data is unavailable from 
Datastream. In accordance with the disclosure requirement of the pension accounting standards 
(FRS17 and IAS19), the fair value of scheme assets and the return on scheme assets in 2005 and 
onwards are available from Thompson One Banker
11
. Although the annual benefits paid are not 
available from the Thompson dataset, this only represents a small proportion of the total pension 
assets, so we simulate the pension contributions using the following equation:  
ttttt
ROAPAPAPC −−= −1                                        (11) 
In order to check whether the sensitivities of dividends/investment to pension contributions (α8 
and β8 in equation 6 and 8 respectively), have changed after the new regulations were 
introduced, a time dummy (T2005) is interacted with the PCit-1 variable in both dividend and 
investment equations, to measure the effects on the slope coefficients. So for the dividend 
equation, the modified specification is 
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and for  the investment equation 
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where Τ2005 is a dummy variable equal to 0 for observations before 2005 and 1 in and after 2005, 
when the new funding requirements of the Pensions Act 2004 came into effect. Whilst the 
parameters α9 and β9 capture the change in slope coefficients, changes in the intercept terms 
before and after the introduction of new funding requirements are captured by the individual 
year dummies (γtD and γtI in the Eq (11) and (12) respectively) or by the single dummy variable 
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Τ2005. If the new funding requirement and the required pension contribution made under the 
Pensions Act 2004 do prove to be more financially binding and impose greater financial 
pressures on firms, then the dividend sensitivity should increase and the post-2005 dummies 
should be significant in explaining the regression results. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the full sample of 935 observations over 196 firms for the period 2000-
2007 are given in Panel B of Table 1. One noticeable difference with the earlier period is that the 
mean size of the simulated pensions contributions are higher at 2.2 per cent of assets. Table 4 
and Table 5 show the regression results for dividend and investment equations respectively 
estimated of the full sample period. The first three columns in Table 4 report the empirical 
results using only individual year dummies for the three core specifications. Specification (1) 
reports the results without any funding status control, specification (2) is with funding status 
included, and specification (3) with over- and underfunding as control variables. The last three 
columns consider the change of slope coefficient for pension contribution variables as well as a 
specific time dummy (Τ2005) that measures the change of circumstances before and after 
Pensions Act 2004 in the different specifications. 
 
The number of observations in Table 4 increases to 891 from the 511 in Table 2, but the 
additional data does not alter the main results: pension contributions are still negatively related 
to dividend payments even after controlling for the pension funding status, although the absolute 
value of the coefficient over the whole sample period is reduced to -1.524, though this is 
probably explained by the mean value of the pension contributions to assets (including the 
simulated values) in Panel B of Table 1 being 2.2%, which is significantly larger than the 
previously used PC/A variable. Also in specification (4) when we replace the mandatory 
contribution with the simulated mandatory contribution calculated as described in the previous 
section, the coefficient is still significantly and negatively related to dividend payments. The 
results are similar when using funding status as control variables. Specification (6) adds the  
interaction term between time and MC (Fundingdummy it – 1 × Τ2005  × (PC/A)it – 1) to pick up the 
pre- and post-Pensions Act 2004 effects whilst Specification (7) further adds a 2005 time 
dummy. The estimate of α9, which identifies the effect of the Pensions Act 2004 changes is 
significantly negative in both Specfications (6) and (7), indicating a more pronounced dividend 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
11
 Data on retirement benefits are available in Thompson One Banker from 2001, when FRS17 was introduced. 
However it was not until 2005, when the standard was fully implemented and mandatory disclosure was required, 
that such data became available for most of the companies with DB schemes. 
  
25 
sensitivity to pension contributions under the new funding requirements. We also constructed 
additional time dummy variables allowing for changes in slope coefficients for variables other 
than pension contributions, such as pension funding status. However we found no significant 
effects of these control variables on dividend payments after the introduction of the new funding 
requirement.   
 
Turning to the investment equation in Table 5, we follow Benito and Young (2007) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998) and include both lagged (t – 1) and contemporary (t) independent variables
12
. 
Pension contributions still have no significant impact on investment when adding the additional 
data into the regressions in Specifications (1) and (2). However when we add both over- and 
underfunding as control variables in Specification (3), the coefficient estimate for pension 
contributions is -0.315 and significant at 95% confidence level. When using the simulated 
mandatory contributions variable (Fundingdummyit – 1 × (PC/A)it – 1) in the regression, 
Specification (5) shows that the absolute investment sensitivities are larger when looking at 
mandatory contributions than total contributions. Specifications (6) and (7) include the 
interaction term for time and MC (Fundingdummy it – 1 × Τ2005  × (PC/A)it – 1), and the 2005 time 
dummy (Τ2005). Similar to the findings from the dividend equation in Table 4, the investment 
sensitivity of mandatory contributions after the introduction of the new funding rules are 
significantly ‘more negative’ than before the introduction of the new funding rules. This 
indicates that the firm-specific funding requirements established under the Pensions Act 2004 
have had a more direct impact on firms’ capital expenditure decisions with respect to both 
dividends and investments.  
 
As we have already noted, the coefficients on the simulated pension contributions in Tables 4 
and 5 for the extended dataset, differ from the values in Tables 2 ands 3. Bunn and Trivedi (2005) 
discuss at length their choice of pension contribution data (DataStream item x114) and whether 
it represent a sensible measure of the pension contributions under the accounting standard SSAP 
24.. In order to check whether our simulated pension contribution data is an appropriate measure 
of true pension contributions, the calculation in equation 11 is undertaken for observations 
before 2005 and the results are compared with the values for the actual pension contribution 
taken from Datastream item x114. The correlation coefficient between the simulated data and 
the DataStream disclosures is 0.812, indicating that our simulated pension contributions does 
                                                            
12
 We do not report the contemporary variables to save space in the table. 
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capture most of the information in the actual pension contributions. In addition as a robustness 
check on our results in Tables 2 and 3, regressions were run using the simulated pension 
contribution for all sample years
13
. In the unreported results, the coefficient on the simulated 
pension contributions in the dividend equation was -0.62, and in the investment equation was -
0.72. Only the coefficient of the investment equation is significant, suggesting that the firm-
specific contributions required by the Pensions Act 2004 may have larger effects on investment 
than dividend decisions.  The coefficient estimates for the dummies (Fundingdummy and Τ2005) 
are still significant, indicating that although the simulated pension contributions are a noisier 
measure that the contribution data used in Bunn and Trivedi (2005) before 2005, the post-2005 
pension contributions do have significant impact on firms’ expenditure decisions.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
It has been shown that in an imperfect market where taxes and costly external finance exist, the 
balance sheet adjustments by financially constrained firms deviates from those implied by the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem. This paper investigates a particular form of financial pressure—
company pension contributions, and its relation between corporate expenditures on dividends 
and investments whilst controlling for the correlations between the funding status of pension 
schemes and the firm’s unobserved investment opportunities. 
 
Using a panel of all UK FTSE350 companies with defined benefit schemes between 2001 and 
2004, we established a strong negative relation between the firm’s dividend payments and its 
pension contributions even controlling for the endogeneity of pension funding status on 
investments. However, we find that the effect of pension contribution on investment is weaker 
than that found in Rauh (2006), implying that any balance sheet adjustments are more likely to 
take place through financial channels such as dividends rather than real channels such as 
investment. 
 
In the UK under the MFR, pension contributions for underfunded firms are smoothed over a 
number of years and has been proved to be a poor reflection of firms’ financial conditions and 
                                                            
13 Of course a more sensible check would be to use samples before2005, however this is not possible because of the 
relative scarce of the pension scheme data (on DataStream), which is essential in calculating the simulated 
contributions. 
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insufficient to provide the promised benefits by the scheme. However has subsequently been 
replace from 2005 with a more firm-specific funding requirement, where firms can focus on 
developing an appropriate funding strategy for meeting their own specific pension commitments 
and make the relevant investment decisions accordingly. The pension contributions post-2005 
are likely to be is a better measure of each firm’s specific financial pressures, and may be 
expected to have a more direct influence on the firm’s corporate expenditure decisions.  
 
We examined whether the new funding requirement under the Pensions Act 2004 have had any 
effect on firms’ pension contributions and accordingly their corporate expenditure decisions, by 
extending the sample to include data after the introduction of the new funding requirement. For 
both dividend and investment equations, we found that the dividend and investment sensitivities 
to pension contributions are more pronounced in and after 2005, indicating the contributions 
made under the new funding requirement provides a more precise measure of the financial 
pressure of the pension scheme than the smoothed contributions under the minimum funding 
requirement. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
The whole sample represents 935 year-end observations on 196 firms from FTSE350 constituent list which have at least one defined benefit (DB) pension scheme. All variables are 
winsorized at 99% level to eliminate outliers. Panel A reports the statistics for samples from year 2000 to 2005, and Panel B reports the statistics for the entire sample from 2000 to 
2007. All data values except pension funding status data are taken from Datastream (DS) with pension funding status data hand-collected from individual firms’ annual reports based 
on FRS17/IAS19 disclosure. All the variables are scaled by book value of assets (A, DS item x391). D is the ordinary dividends (DS item x187), I is the firm’s total investment (see 
appendix for detailed calculation method), CF is cash flow equal to after-tax profit plus depreciation (DS item x157 – x172 + x136), cgr is capital gearing ratio (DS item x731) and 
br is Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) borrowing ratio of net interest payments (DS item x153) to pre-tax profits (DS item x157 + x143). Q is an approximation of Tobin’s Q used by 
Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) and Rauh (2006), calculated as the market capitalisation of the firm (DS item mv) plus book assets (DS item x391) minus the sum of common 
equity and deferred taxes (both from Datastream), divided by assets. Funding Status equals the market value of pension liabilities minus the present value of pension assets (a 
positive value means the scheme is in deficit). Overfunding (Underfunding) is the absolute value of funding status for overfunded (underfunded) schemes. The Status Dummy equals 
1 (0) for underfunded (overfunded) schemes. 
 Panel A  Panel B 
 Data from 2000 to 2005, firms=180, observations = 675  Data from 2000 to 2007, firms=196, observations = 935 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation No. Observations  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation No. Observations 
D/A 0.056 0.040 0.187 675  0.024 0.042 0.712 935 
I/A 0.064 0.058 0.209 675  0.016 0.051 1.526 935 
CF/A 0.144 0.142 0.451 675  -0.002 0.151 3.554 935 
cgr 0.651 0.508 2.797 675  0.604 0.478 2.394 935 
br 0.148 0.179 1.610 675  0.808 0.217 4.094 935 
Q 2.129 1.624 1.798 675  1.649 1.526 9.932 935 
PC/A 0.017 0.013 0.025 675  0.022 0.011 0.081 935 
FundingDummy 0.890 1 0.313 675  0.906 1 0.292 935 
PC/A × FundingDummy 0.016 0.011 0.025 675  0.021 0.009 0.078 935 
Funding Status/A 0.098 0.059 0.218 675  0.086 0.048 0.278 935 
Overfunding/A 0.123 0.025 0.327 74  0.107 0.021 0.302 88 
Underfunding/A 0.125 0.072 0.183 601  0.106 0.058 0.268 847 
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Table 2 
GMM-system Regression of Dividends on Pension Contributions 
The table presents the results for the two-step GMM-system estimation in a fixed effect panel data 
model using PcGive. Variables are scaled by end-of-year total book value of assets (A) where 
applicable. D is the firm’s dividend payment, I is investment expenditure, CF is cash flow, cgr is 
capital gearing ratio, br is the borrowing ratio as in Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), Q is Tobin’s Q and 
PC is the firm’s pension contributions. Specifications (1) and (4) consider only the effect of pension 
contributions. In Specification (2) and (5) the pension funding status is used as a control for its 
correlation with unobserved investment opportunities. Specifications (3) and (6) the funding status 
control is underfunding and overfunding, separately. In Specifications (3) to (6) the borrowing ratio is 
excluded from the regressions. Specifications (7) and (8) add company specific group effects into 
Specification (1) and (2). Sargan is a χ2 test of overidentifying restrictions. Asymptotic robust stand 
errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** stand for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Dividendit / Ait 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(D/A)it – 1 -0.821 0.767 -1.368 -3.311 0.280 -0.616 0.465 0.538 
 (1.699) (1.716) (1.605) (4.185) (1.106) (1.08) (1.513) (0.808) 
(D/A)it – 2 0.025 0.010 0.030 0.025 0.009 0.024* 0.029 0.009 
 (0.019) (0.007) (0.022) (0.037) (0.006) (0.015) (0.021) (0.013) 
(I/A)it – 1 -0.425 -0.263 -0.635 -1.385 -0.461* -0.745* -0.653 -0.101 
 (0.450) (0.488) (0.491) (1.417) (0.263) (0.419) (0.638) (0.279) 
(CF/A)it – 1 2.547* -0.218 3.196** 4.890 0.356 2.356** 1.772* -0.151 
 (1.534) (1.468) (1.586) (5.368) (0.825) (1.018) (1.030) (0.569) 
cgrit – 1 0.009 0.000 0.010 0.016 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.021) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) 
brit – 1 -0.071 0.046 -0.087 -0.083   0.017 0.072 
 (0.152) (0.110) (0.145) (0.252)   (0.073) (0.046) 
Qit – 1 -0.042* 0.004 -0.051 -0.097 0.000 -0.039 -0.048 0.000 
 (0.022) (0.010) (0.034) (0.123) (0.011) (0.025) (0.035) (0.006) 
(PC/A)it – 1 -9.591** -3.823 -11.848**  -5.033* -8.459** -7.521* -2.553 
 (4.825) (3.921) (5.946)  (3.233) (3.859) (3.926) (3.930) 
(Funding status/A)it – 1  0.315   0.537   0.108 
  (0.576)   (0.363)   (0.240) 
   -15.490     Fundingdummy it – 1 × 
(PC/A)it – 1    (17.630)     
(Overfunding/A)it – 1   -2.136** 2.529  -1.652** -1.638*  
   (0.965) (2.907)  (0.733) (0.844)  
(Underfunding/A)it – 1   0.102 0.366  0.237 -0.023  
   (0.638) (0.953)  (0.504) (0.480)  
Size effects No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Year effects yes yes yes Yes yes yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.515 0.513 0.396 0.592 0.069 0.124 0.323 0.367 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.708 0.264 0.286 0.882 0.224 0.399 0.915 0.719 
Sargan (p-value) 0.971 0.783 0.957 0.903 0.594 0.841 0.852 0.668 
Number of firms 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 
No. of observations 511 511 511 511 511 511 510 510 
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Table 3 
GMM-system Regression of Investments on Pension Contributions 
The table presents the results for the two-step GMM-system estimation in a fixed effect panel data 
model using PcGive. Variables are scaled by end-of-year total book value of assets (A) where 
applicable. I is the firm’s investment expenditure, CF is cash flow, cgr is capital gearing ratio, br is the 
borrowing ratio as in Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), Q is Tobin’s Q, S is total sales and PC is the firm’s 
pension contributions. Specifications (1) and (4) consider only the effect of pension contributions. In 
Specification (2) and (5) the pension funding status is used as a control for its correlation with 
unobserved investment opportunities. Specifications (3) and (6) the funding status control is 
underfunding and overfunding, separately. In Specifications (3) to (6) the borrowing ratio is excluded 
from the regressions. Specifications (7) and (8) add company specific group effects into Specification 
(1) and (2). Sargan is a χ2 test of overidentifying restrictions. Asymptotic robust stand errors are 
reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** stand for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Investmentit  / Ait  
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(I/A)it – 1 -0.400* -0.462** -0.463** -0.543** -0.314 -0.343 -0.389 -0.433* 
 (0.240) (0.219) (0.215) (0.271) (0.263) (0.224) (0.243) (0.251) 
(I/A)it – 2 -0.155 -0.136 -0.126 -0.108 -0.093 -0.104 -0.150 -0.132 
 (0.151) (0.117) (0.128) (0.103) (0.144) (0.134) (0.136) (0.115) 
(CF/A)it – 1 -0.326 0.267 0.303 0.548 0.373 0.255 0.237 0.246 
 (1.127) (1.019) (1.039) (0.957) (0.819) (0.838) (0.816) (0.885) 
cgrit – 1 0.001 0.008 0.008 0.014 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.006 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.024) 
brit – 1 -0.440 -0.418 -0.378 -0.538   -0.209 -0.291 
 (0.631) (0.611) (0.603) (0.791)   (0.619) (0.646) 
Qit – 1 -0.018 -0.052 -0.054 -0.082 -0.030 -0.031 -0.034 -0.042 
 (0.042) (0.052) (0.055) (0.077) (0.055) (0.057) (0.049) (0.067) 
(S/A)it – 1 0.129 0.118* 0.110 0.111 0.089 0.096 0.117* 0.120 
 (0.097) (0.070) (0.075) (0.079) (0.069) (0.071) (0.074) (0.086) 
(PC/A)it – 1 -7.789 -3.714 -2.916  -1.766 -2.424 -4.542 -4.803 
 (6.357) (7.431) (6.788)  (5.767) (5.863) (5.680) (6.425) 
(Funding status/A)it – 1  -0.859   -0.769  -0.609  
  (1.264)   (1.019)  (1.295)  
   -4.472     Fundingdummy it – 1 × 
(PC/A)it – 1    (8.377)     
(Overfunding/A)it – 1   1.131 1.075  -2.075  3.516 
   (5.248) (4.875)  (5.730)  (9.795) 
(Underfunding/A)it – 1   -0.786 -0.835  -0.761  -0.349 
   (1.234) (1.163)  (1.052)  (1.219) 
Size effects No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.972 0.939 0.772 0.912 0.355 0.878 0.756 0.527 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.987 0.402 0.461 0.570 0.477 0.286 0.839 0.754 
Sargan (p-value) 0.892 0.905 0.774 0.842 0.827 0.764 0.795 0.679 
Number of firms 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 
No. of observations 496 496 496 496 496 496 495 495 
 
 
  
33
Table 4 
Impact of New post-2005 Funding Requirements: Dividend Equation 
The table presents the results for the two-step GMM-system estimation in a fixed effect panel data 
model using PcGive. Variables are scaled by end-of-year total book value of assets (A) where 
applicable. D is the firm’s dividend payment, I is investment expenditure, CF is cash flow, cgr is 
capital gearing ratio, br is the borrowing ratio as in Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), Q is Tobin’s Q and 
PC is the firm’s pension contributions. Τ2005 is a time dummy set to be 0 for observations before 2005 
and 1 in and after 2005. Specifications (1) considers only the effect of pension contributions. In 
Specification (2) the pension funding status is used as a control for its correlation with unobserved 
investment opportunities. Specifications (3) the funding status control is underfunding and overfunding, 
separately. Specifications (4) to (6) use proximate mandatory contributions in the regression. The 
sample data range from fiscal year 2000 to 2007 and p-values for the time dummies of year 2004 to 
2007 are reported. Asymptotic robust stand errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** stand for 10%, 
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Dividendit / Ait 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(D/A)it – 1 0.194 0.402 0.496 -0.793 0.568 -0.864 -0.469 
 (0.908) (0.677) (0.420) (0.806) (1.812) (0.758) (0.765) 
(D/A)it – 2 -0.008 -0.015 -0.028 0.002 0.037 -0.009 -0.007 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.028) (0.023) (0.029) (0.021) (0.026) 
(I/A)it – 1 1.009*** 0.840*** 0.478 1.304*** 0.698 0.848*** 0.959*** 
 (0.130) (0.120) (0.722) (0.062) (0.844) (0.160) (0.170) 
(CF/A)it – 1 0.100 0.052 0.047 0.216 0.169 0.217* 0.150 
 (0.153) (0.100) (0.058) (0.144) (0.318) (0.130) (0.92) 
cgrit – 1 -0.201*** -0.165*** -0.257*** -0.003 -0.006 0.001 0.000 
 (0.051) (0.060) (0.089) (0.005) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) 
brit – 1 -0.012 -0.016 -0.020 -0.013 -0.012 -0.025 0.022 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.059) (0.019) (0.027) (0.015) 
Qit – 1 0.055*** 0.044*** 0.059*** 0.007  0.003 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.015) (0.016)  (0.012) (0.010) 
(PC/A)it – 1 -1.524*** -1.321*** -1.333**     
 (0.149) (0.253) (0.146)     
   -0.947*** -0.663* 5.009** 3.340 Fundingdummy it – 1 × 
(PC/A)it – 1    (0.058) (0.390) (2.307) (2.083) 
(Funding status/A)it – 1  0.343   1.072   
  (0.438)   (1.393)   
(Overfunding/A)it – 1   -1.005     
   (1.397)     
(Underfunding/A)it – 1   -0.188     
   (0.556)     
Τ2005       0.029 
       (0.031) 
Fundingdummy it – 1 × 
(PC/A)it – 1 × Τ2005 
     -5.701*** -4.067** 
      (2.113) (1.969) 
Y2003 (p-valuel) 0.01*** 0.07* 0.72 0.49 0.48 0.09* — 
Y2004 (p-valuel) 0.30 0.77 0.94 0.19 0.52 0.44 — 
Y2005 (p-valuel) 0.71 0.92 0.81 0.09* 0.56 0.77 — 
Y2006 (p-valuel) 0.84 0.81 0.26 0.63 0.65 0.12 — 
Number of firms 180 179 179 174 174 174 174 
No. of observations 891 886 886 763 763 763 763 
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Table 5 
Impact of New post-2005 Funding Requirements: Investment Equation 
The table presents the results for the two-step GMM-system estimation in a fixed effect panel data 
model using PcGive. Variables are scaled by end-of-year total book value of assets (A) where 
applicable. I is the firm’s investment expenditure, CF is cash flow, cgr is capital gearing ratio, br is the 
borrowing ratio as in Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), Q is Tobin’s Q, S is total sales and PC is the firm’s 
pension contributions. Τ2005 is a time dummy set to be 0 for observations before 2005 and 1 in and after 
2005. Specifications (1) considers only the effect of pension contributions. In Specification (2) the 
pension funding status is used as a control for its correlation with unobserved investment opportunities. 
Specifications (3) the funding status control is underfunding and overfunding, separately. 
Specifications (4) to (6) use Τ2005 and Τ2005  × (PC/A)it – 1 as the time and group controls in the 
regression. The sample data range from fiscal year 2000 to 2007 and p-values for the time dummies of 
year 2004 to 2007 are reported. Asymptotic robust stand errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** 
stand for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. The regressions use both contemporary 
and lagged independent variables but only results for the latter are reported to save space. 
 Dependent variable: Investmentit  / Ait 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(I /A)it – 1 0.082 0.099 0.172* 0.071 0.154** 0.141* 0.142* 
 (0.076) (0.074) (0.090) (0.074) (0.074) (0.084) (0.080) 
(I /A)it – 2 -0.011 -0.011 0.116 -0.006 0.147 0.092 0.091 
 (0.075) (0.074) (0.089) (0.075) (0.095) (0.093) (0.096) 
(S /A)it – 1 -0.044*** -0.038*** -0.006 -0.043*** -0.012 -0.036*** -0.039*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
(CF/A)it – 1 -0.114 -0.177 -0.131 -0.074 0.002 -0.214** -0.193* 
 (0.133) (0.137) (0.123) (0.139) (0.091) (0.106) (0.110) 
cgrit – 1 -0.003 -0.004* -0.006*** -0.004* -0.006** -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
brit – 1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Qit – 1 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.008 0.032*** 0.009 0.023** 0.027*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) 
(PC/A)it – 1 -0.197 -0.204 -0.315**     
 (0.162) (0.161) (0.132)     
   -0.296 -0.539** 1.582*** 1.475** Fundingdummy it – 1 × 
(PC/A)it – 1    (0.217) (0.220) (0.535) (0.742) 
(Funding status/A)it – 1  -0.040      
  (0.041)      
(Overfunding/A)it – 1   0.042  0.033   
   (0.112)  (0.096)   
(Underfunding/A)it – 1   0.153***  0.131**   
   (0.056)  (0.052)   
Τ2005       0.059** 
       (0.027) 
Fundingdummy it – 1 × 
Τ2005  × (PC/A)it – 1 
     -1.816*** -1.686** 
      (0.586) (0.795) 
Y2003 (p-valuel) 0.92 0.22 0.02** 0.79 0.06* 0.32 — 
Y2004 (p-valuel) 0.57 0.09* 0.38 0.54 0.64 0.78 — 
Y2005 (p-valuel) 0.41 0.68 0.13 0.65 0.19 0.11 — 
Y2006 (p-valuel) 0.60 0.54 0.65 0.39 0.91 0.22 — 
Number of firms 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 
No. of observations 700 700 700 698 698 698 698 
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 Percent 
Figure 1: Pension contributions over time. 
 
 
The graph reports the mean and the median values of pension contributions divided by total assets 
between 2001 and 2004 for all FTSE350 firms with defined benefit pension schemes. Both mean and 
median are expressed in percentage values. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of pension contributions as a percentage of assets. 
 
 
This chart shows the distribution of pension contributions as a percentage of assets on the 10th, 25th, 
50th, 75th and 90th percentile levels, for all FTSE350 firms with defined benefit pension schemes. The 
percentiles are reported in real values.  
 
Percentile 
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Figure 3: Kernel regression of pension contributions on funding status. 
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This graph reports the results for Epanechnikov kernel smoothing using pooled data of pension 
contributions and pension funding status for all FTSE350 firms with defined benefit pension schemes 
from 2001 to 2004. Funding status is calculated as the ratio of pension deficit to total assets therefore 
negative values stand for overfunded schemes and positive values for underfunded schemes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Composition of the assets and liabilities of DB pension schemes 
Pension Assets (PA) Pension Liabilities (PL) 
Opening fair value of scheme assets Opening DB pension liabilities 
(+) Return on the scheme assets (ROA) (+) Pension service cost (PSC) 
(+) Pension interest cost (PIC) (+) Pension contributions (PC) (employer and      
employee contributions) (+) Other cost 
(–) Benefits paid (–) Benefits paid 
Closing fair value of scheme assets Closing DB pension liabilities 
 
